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Abstract
We propose in this article an architecture called trusted timely attacks-tolerating communication architecture (3TCA)
designed for mobile multihop relay (MMR) networks. The 3TCA architecture is based on trusted components
providing trusted time-related and security-related services along with an intrusion-related service while
guaranteeing QoS compensation. 3TCA components are implemented at access nodes such as relay stations (RSs)
and multihop relay base stations (MR-BSs) in order to achieve trusted QoS-aware handover management while
guaranteeing intrusion tolerance. In particular, we provide QoS guarantees in terms of delay, bandwidth and jitter for
the MMR networks while addressing group mobility through performing handover disturbance compensation for
mobile RSs. Meanwhile, we tolerate particular timely-based and DoS attacks through compensating their impact on
the already agreed QoS level. Simulations show that adopting compensation is suited for the MMR context although
it induces additional complexity.
Keywords: QoS, Intrusion tolerance, Multihop relay networks, 3TCA architecture
1 Introduction
The last years have been marked by a growing need for
ubiquitous access to multimedia and real time applica-
tions at the metropolitan scale. Mobile subscribers are
becoming very particular about the quality of the pro-
vided services and the resulting cost. The wireless tech-
nology which will succeed in providing the best QoS at
the minimum cost while being interoperable with exist-
ing technologies will probably gain popularity. The tradi-
tional point to multi-point access is not able to achieve
high throughput when the mobile subscriber moves away
from the base station. Adopting the mesh technology to
increase the coverage has its drawbacks since it induces
complexity in routing, network management, QoS provi-
sion and security guarantees. Recently, the mobile mul-
tihop relay (MMR) networks emerged as an optional
deployment that can be adopted to enhance the cover-
age and the performance in an access network. MMR
networks specification is detailed within the IEEE 802.16j-
2009,[1], which is the new amendment to IEEE 802.16-
2009, [2]. A MMR network encompasses a multihop relay
base station (MR-BS), one or more fixed or mobile relay
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stations (rSs) managed by the network operator and sub-
scriber stations (SSs). The RS relays traffic and signaling
between the SS and the MR-BS when needed and in
more than two hops system, traffic and signaling between
an access RS and MR-BS may be relayed through inter-
mediate RSs. Multihop relay networks can be seen as a
specialization of mesh networks that intends to reduce
the complexity of the mesh mode while enhancing the
wireless coverage and performance.
Providing QoS is a crucial issue for supporting advanced
Internet applications and satisfying customers require-
ments. The IEEE 802.16j-2009 amendment, [1], has been
designed with QoS in mind. Therefore, five scheduling
services have been proposed to address different QoS
requirements related to both real time and non real time
applications. Each scheduling service provides a specific
QoS level to its flows through the definition of specific
QoS metrics including rate, latency, and jitter. Neverthe-
less, the IEEE 802.16j-2009 amendment does not specify
any QoS architectures or scheduling mechanisms that
implement the proposed services, [1]. Besides, the QoS
provision in the multihop relaying context is a complex
issue as multiple hops increase delays resulting by adding
the processing delay at each node. Meanwhile, nodes and
RSs’ mobility causes problems related to end-to-end QoS
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provision since the handover operation induces additional
delays and requires considerable available resources at the
visited access nodes in order to provide the demanded
throughput. Last but not least, the intrusion tolerance
property may be considered as an additional QoS crite-
rion that needs to be adopted in order to guarantee the
provision of secure services.
Meanwhile, the MMR networks should be secure in
order to gain the trust of the customers. The intrusion
tolerance’s aim is to guarantee the security through the
provision of unremitting secure services. More precisely,
an intrusion tolerant system is a system which contin-
ues delivering its services despite the intrusions affecting
it as defined by the important work presented in [3].
Since vulnerabilities are always present in each system and
since the protection measures countering the intrusions
exploiting such vulnerabilities are always imperfect, the
intrusion tolerance property guarantees the continuous
provision of secure and correct services despite partially
successful attacks. The intrusion tolerance property has
been implemented in ad hoc and sensor networks but we
think that it is important to implement this paradigm in
MMR networks. First because we are dealing with a wire-
less network which faces multiple attacks conducted on
the air interface. Second because the MMR networks may
be targeted by serious attacks such as DoS ones whichmay
dramatically affect multiple customers at once.
A few research works addressed separately security and
QoS optimization within multihop relay networks. For
instance, Chang et al. [4] proposed a self-optimization
handover mechanism that uses the global positioning
system (GPS) navigation system in order to reduce the
number of possible handover and optimize the channel
scanning procedure. Chang et al. [5] propose an algo-
rithm that minimizes collusion in contention-based ini-
tial ranging and bandwidth request in order to achieve
fast handover along with low dropping and low collision
probability. Kim et al. [6] designed a speed-sensitive han-
dover under hierarchical cellular system that dynamically
adjusts the cell size of each cellular layer depending on
the distributions of the mean speeds of mobile users in
order to increase the channel utilization and optimize the
dropping probability of new and handover calls. Last but
not least, Ann et al. [7] proposed to secure the routing
for IEEE 802.16j networks but they did not consider the
provision of QoS.
In this article, we intend to address QoS engineering
for MMR networks while taking intrusion tolerance into
account. A few intrusion tolerant routing protocols for
the ad hoc and mesh contexts have addressed QoS issues,
[8,9]. However, such protocols can not be directly adopted
by relay networks. For instance, the QoS and intrusion
tolerant ad hoc routing (QITAR) protocol that was pro-
posed in [8] is a QoS aware intrusion tolerant routing
protocol for ad hoc networks. Nevertheless, QITAR can
not be applied in the MMR context as it is very vul-
nerable to high-speed mobility and it may experience
scalability problems. In order to address the mesh con-
text, we proposed an Intrusion Tolerant routing protocol
called mesh routing with QoS and intrusion tolerance
(MERQIT) that guarantees consistent delay constraints
while securing the route establishment procedure and
achieving good performance at themetropolitan scale, [9].
MERQIT adopts the concept of clusterheads which are in
charge of managing the non line of sight mobile nodes.
Although a clusterhead relays traffic; it is an indepen-
dent mobile node which is not managed by the network
operator.
To the best of authors’ knowledge, no research work
tried to combine QoS provision and intrusion tolerance
for MMR networks within the same framework since both
properties are considered as conflicting. Meanwhile, there
is no research effort in compensating the disturbances
induced by the handover procedure and the possible
attacks on the already agreed QoS. Besides, the intrusion
tolerance concept does not have been applied to themulti-
hop relay context yet. We intend in this article to combine
the provision of QoS and the guarantee of the intrusion
tolerance property forMMR networks. The first challenge
facing us is the secure estimation of the QoS and its guar-
antee despite the RSs’ mobility. Second, we should take
up the challenge of guaranteeing the continuous provision
of the agreed QoS level despite the success of particular
attacks targeting the MMR networks. In order to address
these issues, we propose in this article a QoS architec-
ture for MMR networks called trusted timely attacks-
tolerating communication architecture (3TCA) which
tolerates particular attacks while adopting novel design
principles that enhance the scalability and the efficiency of
our proposed protocols. We also address the RSs’ mobility
and intrusion tolerance within multihop relay networks in
a mature way as we compensate handover and malicious
behavior disturbances on the agreed QoS. Our contribu-
tions in this article are the following: first, we propose a
trusted and efficient way to estimate the QoS delivered
on the wireless edge and core links within the multihop
relay network. Second, we provide an optimized mobility
management that evaluates the handover disturbance in
terms of delay. After that, the disturbance is compensated
by accelerating the affected flows on chosen links along
the path. Our proposed schememay also achieve jitter and
bandwidth compensation. If a complete compensation is
not possible, we propose to come close to the agreed level
through re-performing the admission control procedure
with updated QoS values. Third, we propose a scheme
that detects particular delay-sensitive andDoS attacks and
tolerates them through compensating their side effects on
the agreed QoS level.
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The remainder of this article is organized as follows.
First, we present the state of the art by over-viewing the
IEEE 802.16j specifications regarding QoS, handover and
path management. We also introduce the intrusion tol-
erance concept while examining some research work, as
it is applied to wireless networking and we overview the
requirements for an efficient QoS provision. Second, we
define the novel 3TCA architecture and we present its
services and the QoS compensation it achieves. Third,
we detail the 3TCA implementation in Relay Networks.
After that, we overview the properties and features of
3TCA-based relay networks. Finally, we evaluate the per-
formance of our proposition and we conclude.
2 State of the art
This section presents the state of the art regarding multi-
hop relay networks along with the appliance of the intru-
sion tolerance concept within wireless networks and the
requirements for an efficient QoS provision.
2.1 IEEE 802.16j specifications regarding QoS, handover
and path management
AnMMR network encompasses fixed multihop relay base
stations (MR-BSs), fixed or mobile relay stations (RSs)
managed by the network operator and mobile subscriber
stations (SSs) moving at vehicular speed. The wireless
link between the SS and the managing MR-BS or RS and
the wireless link between the MR-BS or RS and a sub-
ordinate RS during network entry are both called “access
links” while the wireless link between a MR-BS and a RS
or between two RSs is called “relay link” as depicted by
Figure 1. Access and relay links can be either uplinks or
downlinks. The IEEE 802.16j amendments specify that a
dynamic service addition request (DSA-REQ) signalling
message is used for admission control and path manage-
ment in the context of multihop relays with scheduling
RSs, [1]. The DSA-REQ can only be sent over relay links
from the MR-BS or the RS to its subordinate RS. Gener-
ally speaking, a MR-BS sends a DSA-REQ to all RSs on
the path to request an admission control decision. That
request is processed by each RS on the path and forwarded
to its subordinate RS. The DSA-REQ encompasses the
service flow parameters described by Type/Length/Value
(TLVs) fields. A RS sends a DSA-RSP message to the MR-
BS when it can not accept the service flow indicated in the
DSA-REQ or in order to confirm the path management
operation requested in the correspondent DSA-REQ. On
the other hand, the MR-BS should send a DSA-ACK to
all RSs on the path upon receiving a DSA-RSP from an
access RS for the purpose of admission control. Each inter-
mediate RS processes the DSA-ACK and forwards it to
its subordinate RS. The IEEE 802.16j amendments also
define the dynamic service change request (DSC-REQ)
signalling message which is used for admission control
Figure 1MMR network.
and path management whenever a dynamic change of the
parameters of an existing service flow is required.
Routing in wireless multihop relay networks is tree-
based. In order to address path establishment, mainte-
nance and release, the IEEE 802.16j amendments propose
to base routing decisions on metrics such as radio
resource availability, radio link quality and traffic load at
the RSs and propose to take these decisions at the MR-
BS level based on information provided by the RSs, [1].
However, the amendments do not specify how the deci-
sions should bemade, [10]. Besides, the standard proposes
two approaches to path management namely the embed-
ded path management approach and the explicit path
management approach.
The embedded path management approach allocates
the connection identifiers (CIDs) in a hierarchical manner.
More precisely, the MR-BS allocates CIDs to its subordi-
nate stations so that the CIDs allocated to all subordinate
RSs of any station are a subset of the allocated CIDs for
that station. Consequently, the path management is sim-
plified because there is no need to store specific routing
tables at the RS level and there is a reduced need for sig-
naling to update the path information. On the other hand,
the explicit path management approach uses an end-to-
end signalingmechanism in order to distribute the routing
table along the path. In more details, each path is iden-
tified by a path ID to which the CIDs are bound. The
MR-BS needs to send the required information to the RSs
belonging to the concerned path whenever it is created,
updated or removed. Optionally, the MR-BS may specify
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the QoS requirements associated with each CID in order
to enable the RSs to take the scheduling decision indepen-
dently in case of distributed schedulingmode. The explicit
path management approach needs small routing tables at
the RSs and enables a reduction of the overhead required
to update these tables, [10].
Authors of [7] propose a path selection method for the
non-transparentmode of IEEE 802.16j networks that finds
the lowest latency and the best path with high through-
put. The proposed method uses metrics such as link
available bandwidth, signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) and hop
count in order to determine the path cost. The desir-
able path should then balance the load with other paths
fairly by favoring smaller hops and less robust channel
coding schemes. Authors of [7] suggest an example net-
work model for applying the proposed method and prove
its effectiveness. Nevertheless, the proposed method does
not consider the security and may suffer from numerous
attacks such as DoS.
Regarding handover, when a mobile RS hands over,
all the SSs attached to it should also hand over with
it. Besides, the RS-BS can exchange context info on the
backbone in order to accelerate the handover process.
2.2 Intrusion tolerance in wireless networking
The fault tolerance concept was firstly introduced in
the field of software engineering, [3,11]. Its aim was
to preserve the delivery of correct service despite the
presence of active faults, [3]. Fault tolerance is fulfilled
through the error detection and then the subsequent
system recovery. The malicious and accidental fault toler-
ance for internet applications (MAFTIA) project involved
experts from five countries and six organizations and
lasted from January 2000 to February 2003 in order to
investigate the tolerance paradigm for security, [12]. In
more details, the MAFTIA project proposed an inte-
grated distributed architecture based on intrusion tol-
erant systems and designed the required mechanisms
and protocols to form the building blocks of large scale
dependable applications. The MAFTIA project main
results were the provision of a dependable middelware,
dependable trusted third parties, distributed authoriza-
tion mechanisms and large scale Intrusion Detection
Systems. Note that the trusted timely computing base
(TTCB) components were part of the proposed architec-
ture.
Most of the research works that are interested in pro-
viding intrusion tolerance for wireless networks are tar-
geting wireless sensor networks. For instance, Ma et
al. [13] propose a fault-intrusion tolerant framework
called WSN-TUM that incorporates both conventional
non-security fault and intrusion fault management in
order to ensure fault-intrusion tolerant routing. In more
details, the WSN-TUM identifies four types of faults
that can target WSNs which are hardware faults, soft-
ware faults, middelware faults, and intrusion faults and
then adopts multi-path, multi-version and fragmenta-
tion techniques in order to fulfill the intrusion toler-
ance property. Ma et al. [13] assume that there exists
a routing protocol that has already established multiple
paths before the data transmission and that the base sta-
tion and the sensor nodes have pre-built cryptographic
algorithms and pre-distributed keys to generate the ses-
sion keys before the deployment of WSN. They indicate
that at the sending node level, each data packet should
be split into N fragments and then reorganized into M
groups where M is the number of cryptographic algo-
rithms supported by the sending node. Each group is then
encrypted with a different encryption algorithm, [13].
Each packet of the N encrypted fragments is encoded
into N + K fragments using the forward error cor-
rection (FEC) erasure coding before transmission. The
obtained fragments are finally transmitted to the des-
tination using multiple disjoint paths. After the recep-
tion of more than N encrypted fragments and their
authentication and integrity checking, the receiving node
reconstructs the encrypted data packet. The combina-
tion of data fragmentation over multiple paths com-
bined with the multi-version encryption minimizes the
chances of an attacker to get the complete data at one
time, [13].
The scheme proposed in [13] can not be adopted for
multihop relay networks as the routing architecture is a
tree where each RS has only one superordinate. More pre-
cisely, it is not possible to transmit the packets of one flow
on different disjoint routes because there exists only one
branch (i.e., route) from the sending RS to the MR-BS.
Another shortcoming of this protocol is that all the sen-
sor nodes are involved in securing the transmission; this
means that the base station has not to make an extra effort
for guaranteeing security even if it is more powerful in
terms of processing capabilities and power. Besides, this
scheme makes it hard to ensure global QoS since frag-
ments of the same packet will use different routes with dif-
ferent QoS capabilities and the destination needs to wait
for getting the fragments; which may induce additional
delays.
Tang et al. [14] designed two routing protocols that min-
imize the number of hops between a source node and a
destination node while maximizing the lifetime of sen-
sor networks. Besides, they considered security challenges
targeting the wireless sensor networks and proposed a
secure routing protocol called SecMLR which works in an
energy-efficient way in order to resist potential attacks,
[14]. In more detail, the adopted architecture combines
wireless sensor networks and mesh networks by deploy-
ing mesh routers within the monitoring areas (i.e., sensor
networks) and mesh gateways in order to transmit the
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sensed data in long-distance and reliable fashion. The
mesh gateways play the role of sink nodes, routers and
gateways.
In order to optimize the performance of the routing ser-
vice in the hybrid architecture, [14] proposed two routing
protocols called shortest path routing (SPR) and maxi-
mal network lifetime routing (MLR) and then tried to
secure the last one. The SPR protocol minimizes the num-
ber of hops of data transmission between each sensor
node and a gateway; thus minimizing the total hops of a
sensor network. However, the MLR protocol maximizes
the network lifetime (i.e., the time when the first sensor
node drains its energy) by minimizing the total energy
consumption of all sensors in the network while mini-
mizing the differences between individual nodes energy
consumption and average energy consumption. Securing
the MLR protocol by different measures gives birth to
the secure maximal network lifetime routing (SecMLR).
A node that needs to send data but does not have set
up a routing table broadcasts a routing query to m des-
tinations. When a node receives the request for the first
time, it broadcasts the message after appending itself in
the path field. Duplicate requests are not re-broadcasted.
When a gateway receives a routing query packet, it ver-
ifies the authenticity of the sender and verifies whether
the message is replayed by a malicious node by check-
ing a counter value. After that, the gateway waits for a
timeout in order to collect multiple path information and
then calculates the shortest path between the source and
the destination using a particular formula, [14]. Finally, a
routing response is given back to the source. The gate-
ways need to broadcast their new places using the μTesla
protocol, [15], in order to achieve authenticated broad-
cast.
The fault or intrusion tolerance is simply achieved by
setting up routing tables with multiple entries ending
to specified gateways so that data which failed to reach
the destination using a particular route may choose a
different path. This scheme can be adopted for multi-
hop relay networks only on the backbone between the
neighboring intermediate BSs (i.e., from the sender MR-
BS to the destination MR-BS). In more detail, the route
from the sending RS to its MR-BS and the route between
the destination MR-BS and its managed destination RS
are already known and fixed (i.e., branches of one tree).
Therefore, we do not have to choose from different
paths. Besides, this scheme was designed in order to save
the energy of the sensing nodes adopting it. In multi-
hop relay networks, the MR-BSs which are the unique
entities able to adopt this scheme do not have energy
constraints. Last but not least, authors of [14] did not
consider particular QoS constraints in terms of delay,
jitter or throughput in their proposed secure routing
protocol. Therefore, applying this scheme for multihop
relay networks will not provide us with the required QoS
guarantees.
To the best of authors’ knowledge, there is presently
no research work that addresses the issue of intrusion
tolerance within relay networks. This is mainly due to the
fact that the proposed intrusion tolerance solutions for
ad hoc, sensor or mesh networks can not be applied to
the relay context without introducing some modifications
induced by the particularities of the relaying concept.
More precisely, the network topology of the multihop
relay is a tree rooted at the MR-BS which differs from the
mesh topology of ad hoc, sensor or mesh networks. Sec-
ond, the Multihop Relay mode is simpler than the ad hoc
or mesh mode as mobile nodes within a relay network
just enjoy the connection while all the processing regard-
ing the relaying activity is transferred at the Relay Station
level. Moreover, the relay mode is intended to bemore sta-
ble than the ad hoc, sensor or mesh ones because the MR
nodes relaying traffic and signalling have more computing
and power capabilities and are managed by the network
operator.
2.3 Requirements for an efficient QoS provision over
MMR networks
The IEEE 802.16j amendments introduce multiple con-
cepts related to QoS provision such as service flow
QoS scheduling, dynamic service establishment and two-
phase activation model, [1]. Five data delivery services are
defined which are the unsolicited grant service (UGS),
the real-time variable-rate service (RT-VR), the non-real-
time variable-rate service (NRT-VR), the best effort ser-
vice (BE) and the Extended real-time variable-rate service
(ERT-VR). These services support real-time applications
generating fixed and variable data rates along with appli-
cations requiring a guaranteed data rate while being
insensitive to delays and applications with no rate or delay
requirements. Nevertheless, the IEEE 802.16j amend-
ments do not indicate how to implement such services.
Although the amendments identify QoS parameters such
as maximum latency, tolerated jitter, minimum reserved
traffic rate, maximum sustained traffic rate and traffic pri-
ority that implement the provided services, the choice of
a specific algorithm or procedure that implements the
QoS provision and optimizes it is left to the network
operators, [1].
Besides, the IEEE 802.16j amendments define signalling
messages that are used when discovering routes with a
predefined QoS level but do not specify an algorithm
that manages the routes establishment and maintenance
in case of a handover while providing the required QoS
level. Therefore, specific call admission control (CAC)
algorithms and route maintenance in case of mobility
algorithms should be defined by the network operators
with regard to their specific needs. Meanwhile, the IEEE
Krichene and Boudriga EURASIP Journal onWireless Communications and Networking 2013, 2013:100 Page 6 of 22
http://jwcn.eurasipjournals.com/content/2013/1/100
802.16j amendments do not indicate particular proce-
dures that enable the QoS estimation over the links. For
instance, it is not indicated how to evaluate the delay or
the throughput value over a wireless link. Besides, it is not
indicated how to verify the pretended QoS values over the
wireless links.
If security is considered as an additional QoS parameter,
the IEEE 802.16j amendments do not specify particular
procedures that enable the detection of potential attacks
conducted by malicious SSs and probably malicious RSs.
Therefore, a successful timely-based attack or denial of
service (DoS) or distributed DoS (DDoS) attack against
the MMR network may degrade the QoS requested by
legitimate customers and impair the corporate image of
the network operator.
In order to achieve an efficient QoS provision, the
MMR networks should implement efficient algorithms for
CAC that enlighten the choice of the best routes afford-
ing the required QoS level. Besides, specific procedures
should enable the route maintenance in case of RSs or SSs
mobility so that the customers can enjoy ubiquitous ser-
vices with nearly the same QoS level despite their high
mobility. Last but not least, the MMR network should
be intrusion tolerant in order to continue providing the
agreed QoS level despite intrusions. In more detail, an
intrusion tolerant MMR network will enhance the QoS
provision through using specific ways to detect poten-
tial intrusions and efficiently reacting to them without
dramatically altering the QoS level agreed with the cus-
tomer.
In this article, we propose an architecture called 3TCA
for MMR networks. The 3TCA architecture enables a
trusted QoS estimation over wireless links while com-
pensating for the impact of mobile RSs handoff on the
affected flows. Thanks to the 3TCACs, the proposed
architecture achieves also timely-based and DoS attacks
detection and continues delivering the nearly same QoS
level despite such attacks. A comparison of the 3TCA
architecture and the existing research work is given in
Table 1.
3 3TCA: a novel trusted timely attacks-tolerating
communication architecture
We define in this section our novel trusted timely attacks-
tolerating communication architecture called 3TCA and
we describe the services that it guarantees in order to
achieve QoS and intrusion tolerance provision for MMR
networks.
Table 1 Comparing the 3TCA architecture with the current research work
Research work Characteristics Shortcomings
Self optimization HandOver (HO)
mechanism,[4]
Reduces HO numbers and optimizes channel
scanning
-Does not consider security issues-Uses GPS
Fast HO scheme, [5] Minimizes collisions in order to achieve fast HO Does not consider security issues
Speed sensitive HO scheme, [6] Speed sensitive HO under hierarchical cellular
system
Does not consider security issues
Path selection method, [7] Secures the routing for MMR networks Does not consider QoS issues
QITAR, [8] Achieves QoS and intrusion tolerance for ad hoc
networks
-Vulnerable to high-speed mobility-May experi-
ence scalability problems
MERQIT, [9] Achieves QoS and intrusion tolerance for mesh
networks
-Clusterheads are mobile nodes that may expe-
rience attacks and leave the network-Isolates
malicious nodes
WSN-TUM, [13] Fault-intrusion tolerant framework for sensor net-
works
-Split the packet on fragments and send them
on disjoint routes. However MMR networks use
the same route as the routing architecture is a
tree rooted at the MR-BS-Global QoS is hard to
guarantee since each fragment uses a different
route with different QoS constraints-All sensors
participate in the securization effort. For MMR
networks, this should be the task of the MR-BS
SPR, MLR and SecMLR, [14] Secure routing protocols for sensor networks -Intrusion tolerance is simply achieved by set-
ting up routing tables with multiple entries to
specified gateways-If the scheme is adopted for
MMR networks, it can be only implemented on
the backbone-QoS constraints are not consid-
ered
Our method -Architecture designed for MMR networks-
Achieves QoS and intrusion tolerance for MMR
networks-Compensates HO delays-Detects
attacks and compensates their impact on the
agreed QoS
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3.1 3TCA definition
The 3TCA architecture is formed by the intercon-
nection of trusted software components called 3TCA
components (3TCACs). The 3TCACs are implemented
on the access nodes which are the RSs and the MR-BSs
and form a backbone allowing fast and protected com-
munication between its nodes. The interconnection of
3TCACs within the relay network gives birth to a dis-
tributed component that provides trusted time-related
and secure-related services along with an intrusion-
related service that guarantee intrusion detection and
tolerance to a set of attacks. Meanwhile, the 3TCACs pro-
vide QoS compensation in order to minimize the negative
impact of handover and possible attacks on the pro-
vided QoS. The interconnection of 3TCACs is assumed
to be accomplished via a completely secure wireless chan-
nel that implements cryptographic tunnels as illustrated
by Figure 2.
The 3TCA architecture also defines 3TCA Entities
(3TCAEs) which are application-level entities that reside
over the Operating System and communicate via insecure
wireless channels. 3TCAEs may be attacked and behave
maliciously. The 3TCAEs use the trusted services of the
3TCACs in order to participate in the 3TCA’ protocols
implementation within an intrusion-tolerant environment.
Thanks to the 3TCACs, the 3TCA architecture enables
the provision of trusted services and the correct imple-
mentation of the 3TCA protocols despite the proba-
bly malicious behavior of the 3TCAEs and the attacks
that may target the wireless insecure channel. Since all
the 3TCACs are synchronous while 3TCAEs are asyn-
chronous and since all 3TCACs are assumed to be secure
while 3TCAEs may be malicious, we conclude that the
3TCA architecture provides a hybrid intrusion-controlled
environment with distributed trusted components. The
3TCACs implement the necessary validations and ver-
ifications to provide trusted values of QoS, detect the
possibly malicious behaviors and most importantly com-
pensate the negative impacts of group mobility and some
time-related and DoS attacks.
Figure 2 Interconnection of 3TCACs.
3.2 3TCA services
The 3TCA services are provided by the trusted 3TCACs
and may be summarized as follows:
3.2.1 Trusted time-related services
The 3TCACs provide two trusted time-related services,
namely the trusted absolute timestamping service and the
trusted duration measurement services.
• The trusted absolute timestamping service: provides
a global timestamp value shared between all 3TCACs
as each 3TCAC is equipped with an internal clock
that is synchronized with all other 3TCACs’ clocks.
The precision of the timestamp value is determined
by the precision of the adopted clock synchronization
protocol. Note that the 3TCAE entity which asks its
3TCAC for a trusted timestamp value will receive it
after a variable delay that highly depends on the
processing capabilities of the hosting node.
• The trusted duration measurement service: computes
the time required to execute a function by evaluating
the beginning and the ending timestamps of that
function.
3.2.2 Trusted security-related services
The trusted authentication service and the trusted ran-
dom number generation service are the security services
provided by the 3TCACs.
• The trusted authentication service: enables a 3TCAE
to authenticate itself and to communicate securely
with its local 3TCAC. We assume that each 3TCAC
has an asymmetric key pair. The 3TCAE
authenticates itself to its local 3TCAC through
sending a challenge Xe and a symmetric key Ke both
encrypted with the 3TCAC’s public key. The 3TCAC
authenticates itself to the 3TCAE entity by sending
the signature of the challenge encrypted with its
private key. After that, the symmetric key Ke is used
to encrypt the exchanged data between the entity
3TCAE and its trusted component 3TCAC.
• The trusted random number generation service:
generates trustworthy uniformly distributed numbers
that are required for building cryptographic
primitives such as authentication protocols.
3.2.3 Trusted intrusion-related service
The novel trusted thresholds handling service described
below is also provided by the 3TCACs.
• The trusted thresholds handling service: manages the
variables configured with threshold values and
generates alert messages when the thresholds are
exceeded.
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3.3 3TCA compensation
The 3TCA architecture provides QoS compensation
for handing over RSs by accelerating the affected
flows. More precisely, once the duration of the han-
dover process is computed by the 3TCACs, the QoS
of the affected flows is revised through decreasing
the delay values and optionally decreasing the jit-
ter values and increasing the bandwidth by adopting
either a linear approach or an exponential approach.
A new CAC is processed with the updated QoS val-
ues on chosen links in order to rapidly find a suitable
route.
On the other hand, malicious RSs may try various time-
related and DoS attacks. Unfortunately, isolating such
malicious actors will dramatically decrease the coverage
area since the relay topology is a tree and the isolation
of one RS may doom a whole branch. To address this
issue, the MR-BS managing the malicious RS will cal-
culate the delay and/or jitter induced by its presence
and then it will compensate it according to the load of
the involved links. The compensation is fulfilled through
executing a new CAC with updated values of delay, jit-
ter and throughput. Note that the MR-BS may send a
different signalling message containing different delay,
throughput or jitter values in order to individually per-
form admission control on the links forming the path to
the destination as each link may have a different load con-
dition. However, the MR-BS will choose the values for
CAC so that the end-to-end QoS requirements are met
even if each link on the path may provide a different
QoS.
The trusted timely computing base (TTCB) is a
software component which has been developed in the
malicious and accidental fault tolerance for internet appli-
cations (MAFTIA) project. Themain goal of theMAFTIA
project is to construct dependable trustworthy applica-
tions implemented by a set of distributed components
with varying degrees of trustworthiness, [3]. The TTCB
module can be viewed as a secure real-time distributed
component that guarantees trusted services related to
time and security such as the trusted block agreement, the
trusted duration measurement, and the trusted absolute
timestamping, [16]. In an Internet architecture, each host
has a local module called the local TTCB. These modules
are interconnected by the secure control channel and form
the distributed trusted component (DTC). The TTCB
assists the applications running between participants in
the concerned hosts which are interconnected by a vul-
nerable Payload Channel and form the payload system
subject to arbitrary byzantine failures. Nevertheless, the
TTCB modules do not handle threshold values in order
to detect malicious behavior and react in time. Moreover,
the TTCB modules were not programmed to perform
QoS compensation.
3.4 3TCA detailed description
The 3TCA architecture is a novel architecture designed
for MMR networks which provides QoS and intrusion-
tolerance despite group mobility and probable attacks
that may target the access nodes (i.e., RSs and MR-BSs).
This architecture is based on trusted 3TCACs which
offer time-related, security-related and intrusion-related
services in order to form a secure communication envi-
ronment with QoS guarantees. QoS provision is achieved
first through securely estimating the QoS parameters
using the trusted 3TCACs services and second through
compensating the negative impact of handover and a
set of attacks on the previously agreed QoS level. The
TTCB component defined in the frame of the MAFTIA
project lacks threshold management and compensation
processing and offers useless services (i.e., such as trusted
agreement) for the relay context; therefore, it needs to
be revised in order to be adopted within the 3TCA
architecture.
The 3TCACs are enriched with tables and matrices
describing the network entities so that they become able
to control their behavior. Besides, some threshold vari-
ables were included so that the 3TCAC component can
decide whether an entity is malicious. Furthermore, we
made the 3TCAC component the sole entity that creates
the control messages, signs or encrypt them (i.e., sender’s
3TCAC) and then verify and process them (i.e., receiver’s
3TCAC). Last but not least, we used the time related ser-
vices to make the 3TCAC component detect timely-based
attacks and compensate the impact of both handover and
malicious behaviors.
Moreover, the 3TCACs have been enhanced in order to
provide intrusion tolerance for multihop relay networks
while respecting the QoS constraints. Even if malicious
entities try various attacks, their potential damage will
be limited since routing actions will be globally pro-
cessed and secured by the 3TCACs while a timed behavior
is supported to provide QoS guarantees. The 3TCACs
are deployed on each RS and MR-BS. Each 3TCAC is
equipped with a matrix encompassing the registered SSs
and subordinate RSs along with the QoS and intrusion
information related to them. The signalling messages are
created and processed by the 3TCACs in order to val-
idate the contained information and detect the entities
trying to compromise the integrity or the identity of the
issuer.
We also defined threshold values for delay and jit-
ter that may be dynamically updated in order to
detect the entities that refuse to participate in the
QoS routing process through pretending higher delay
and jitter values. The probably-malicious-RS variable is
incremented each time the 3TCAC notices an infrac-
tion. When the probably-malicious-RS value reaches a
pre-configured threshold, a probably-malicious-RS-Alert
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message is forwarded until the MR-BS. Upon receiving
that alert, the 3TCAC of the MR-BS will try to compen-
sate theQoS disturbance caused by themalicious behavior
through updating the QoS values on some chosen links.
Furthermore, the 3TCACs which are synchronized will
raise an infraction if they do not receive the signalling
messages within a pre-configured threshold period. In
this case, they will increment the probably-malicious-RS
variable and send a probably-malicious-RS-Alert message
when required. Multiple colluding SSs may decide to gen-
erate simultaneous requests to cause a distributed DoS
to the managing RS. To address this issue, the 3TCAC
kernels will be configured to not process more than a
threshold value of requests sent by the same SS within a
period of time and to not process more than n requests or
QoS estimations overall.
4 3TCA implementation in relay networks
We propose in this article an architecture called 3TCA
that provides intrusion tolerant routing andQoS forMMR
networks. In more detail, we propose to guarantee QoS in
terms of delay, bandwidth and jitter for the multihop relay
networks while addressing mobility through performing
handover disturbance compensation in case of mobile
RSs. Meanwhile, we tolerate particular timely-based and
DoS attacks through compensating their impact on the
agreed QoS level.
4.1 Network modeling
Themultihop relay networks are organized in a tree topol-
ogy and define the RS stations which relay the traffic of N-
LoS SSs to the MR-BSs. MR-BSs manage the subscribers
of their coverage areas and enable the communication
with external networks. The assumed multihop relay net-
work depicted in Figure 3 accommodates three kinds of
nodes. The relay stations may be fixed or mobile. The
RSs and the MR-BSs host 3TCACs while SSs do not. The
hosted 3TCACs will be respectively called RS_3TCAC
and BS_3TCAC. Non Line of Sight SSs (NLoS SSs) con-
nect to the MR-BSs through the RSs. However Line of
Sight SSs (LoS SSs) may directly be managed by MR-BSs.
Viewed by a NLoS SS, the network topology is tree-rooted
at the MR-BS where a branch is formed by intermedi-
ate RSs. We also assume that a mobile RS (i.e., always
found in trains and other transportation systems) can
only be a superordinate access station for the passengers’
SSs moving with the vehicle and that it can only have
fixed RSs as superordinates. We argue that having mobile
RSs as superordinates for non-passengers’ SSs wastes
time and resources as the mobile superordinate may
move away from its subordinate either during the man-
agement phase (i.e., network entry, path establishment,
etc) or during the data transfer phase. In this case, the
managed subordinate should reprocess the management
Figure 3 The adoptedmultihop relay network model.
procedure or wait until a new path is found. Therefore,
we always consider a fixed network backbone while the
mobile RSs will only manage mobile SSs that are moving
with them.
4.2 QoS provision within the multihop relay networks
We design an architecture called 3TCA that provides QoS
in a trusted way. Mobility will be particularly addressed
in order to compensate the delays induced by handing
over RSs. Besides, timely-based attacks will be tolerated
while respecting the particularities of the multihop relay
networks.
4.2.1 QoS Estimation over routes linking fixed entities
In our network model, theMR-BSs and the fixed RSs form
a fixed backbone and each MR-BS, RS and SS should be
uniquely identified within the network. We assume that
each fixed RS knows exactly its superordinate on the path
to the MR-BS. Such information may be assigned by the
operator or provided by the managing MR-BS. The MR-
BS assigns a unique path-ID to each branch and each fixed
RS records the path-ID(s) of the path(s) it belongs to. We
propose that each fixed RS periodically initiates a QoS
estimation over the link between it and its superordinate.
The estimated QoS values in terms of Delay (ms), Rate
(bits/s) and Jitter (ms) are sent to the superordinate within
a BS-QoS-INFO message and should be forwarded until
the MR-BS.
After collecting the QoS information of each link, the
MR-BS deduces the global QoS that can be guaranteed
over the whole path (branch) as the maximum value of
delays over the links forming the path, the minimum
values of rates over the links forming the path and the
maximum value of jitters over the links forming the path.
Besides, each MR-BS periodically estimates the QoS over
the wireless links between it and its neighboring MR-BSs.
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The period value may be fixed by the network operator.
Note that the QoS estimation procedure should be initi-
ated from the leaf fixed RS to the root MR-BS in order to
minimize the number of transmitted signalling messages
(i.e., overhead).
4.2.2 Admission control of handing overmobile relays
When a mobile RS enters a new coverage area, the mobile
RS needs to serve multiple service flows issued by its man-
aged SSs. A separate admission control procedure should
be executed for each service flow. We think that the avail-
able QoS between the managed SSs and the mobile RS
needs to be re-estimated since the physical properties of
the wireless link may change. The mobile RS needs to
adapt the provided QoS in order to compensate the han-
dover disturbance and the probable modification of the
available QoS on the edge links (i.e., links between it
and the managed SSs). For that reason, we propose that
each mobile RS entering a new coverage area initiates an
edge QoS re-estimation with each managed SS and then
adapts the QoS requirements of each flow issued by the
concerned managed SS. After that, the mobile RS sends
a DSA-REQ on its name to its superordinate for each
flow. That request encompasses the source identifier, the
destination identifier and the required QoS in terms of
minimum rate, maximum delay and tolerated jitter. Note
that in our case, the DSA-REQ will travel from a subordi-
nate mobile RS to its superordinate in order to minimize
the overhead.
In our model, the MR-BS already has an estimate of the
QoS on the sub-path from the mobile RS to it, the MR-
BS can also receive QoS information of other paths on the
backbone. TheMR-BS may directly route flows which can
not tolerate delays using the QoS information of the can-
didate paths. The MR-BS may also send a DSA-REQ to
all the RSs on the candidate path(s) in order to request
an admission control decision as specified by the IEEE
802.16j amendments because the QoS information can be
updated, especially when the configured period of QoS
re-estimation is relatively high.
4.2.3 QoS estimation
In this section, we detail the procedures adopted in order
to estimate the QoS parameters in a reliable manner
using the 3TCAC modules. We also overview the mech-
anisms that will be used to fulfill handover disturbance
compensation.
If a sequence of packets is sent from a source point A
to a destination point B, each of the packets will need a
slightly different time to reach the destination. Formally,
jitter may be defined as the statistical variance of the data
packet inter-arrival time. According to [17], and when
adopting the real time protocol (RTP), jitter is measured
in timestamp units. For example, if the transmitted audio
is sampled at the usual 8000Hz, the unit will be 18000
of a second. The endpoint computes an estimate using
a simplified formula (i.e., a first order estimator). More
precisely, to estimate the jitter J(i) after the reception of
the ithpacket, we need to calculate the change of the inter-
arrival time, and then divide it by 16 to reduce noise and
add it to the previous jitter value as described by the fol-
lowing formula J(i) = J(i − 1) + (|D(i−1,i)|−J(i−1))16 , where
the value D(i − 1, i) is the difference of relative transit
times for the two packets. That difference is computed as
D(i, j) = (Rj − Ri) − (Sj − Si) = (Rj − Sj) − (Ri − Si)
where Siis the timestamp from the packet i and Riis the
time of arrival for packet i, [17]. The assumption which is
made is that the sender sends one packet each 20 millisec-
onds and that the ideal transit time is 10 milliseconds. The
computation also starts from zero and not from a random
value, which means that Si = 0 and Ri = 10. The jit-
ter value starts to grow slowly despite large differences. In
fact, when the large differences disappear (i.e., i > 8 ), the
estimate starts to approach the approximate mean value,
[17].
We estimate the jitter value using the 3TCAC related
services which are the trusted absolute timestamping
service and the trusted duration measurement service.
The QoS values will be estimated only on the inse-
cure wireless channel. In order to estimate the jitter
in a reliable fashion on the backbone, we propose that
3TCAE(n − 1) calls its RS-3TCAC(n − 1) each 20 ms
in order to get a QoS-Estim message and then send it
to 3TCAE(n) on the insecure wireless channel as shown
in Figure 4. 3TCAE(n) forwards the received message
to its 3TCAC which verifies the QoS-Estim and then
extracts the valuable information required to compute
the jitter. That pre-described procedure is repeated 9
times in order to estimate a mean jitter value. If the
computed jitter value does not exceed a pre-configured
MaxJitterThreshold, 3TCAC(n) will add it to a BS-QoS-
INFO message that will be given back to the appli-
cation entity in order to forward it to the superordi-
nate.
In order to estimate the jitter on the wireless edge
links between the RS and the managed SSs, the RS-
3TCAC sends a QoS-REQ signalling message to its
payload entity and then triggers the trusted absolute
timestamping service. The 3TCAE entity forwards the
received packet to the SS which should answer with a
first QoS-RSP message. 3TCAE receives the QoS-RSP
and then forwards it to the RS-3TCAC which com-
putes the edge delay between the RS and the SS. As the
jitter computation requires a synchronization between
the entity which will send the equivalent of the RTP
packets each 20ms and the entity which will receive
them, the RS-3TCAC and the SS need to have the same
clock values.
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Figure 4 Trusted jitter estimation on the backbone.
However, we already stated that only 3TCAC modules
are synchronized. Therefore, the SSs may have com-
pletely different clock values compared to their man-
aging RSs. To address this issue, we propose to use
the already computed delay value in order to synchro-
nize the SS and its managing RS. In more detail, on
receiving the first QoS-RSP message, the RS-3TCAC
generates a QoS-Sync message and then sends it to its
application entity.
The QoS-Sync message indicates the clock value that
should be adopted by the SS when sending the next
12 QoS-RSP messages. That clock value is given by
the following formula C0 = currentTimestamp + α +
computed edge delay, where currentTimestamp is the
value of the timestamp when computing the clock value
and α is the delay of the communication between the
3TCAC and its entity added to the delay required by
the receiving SS to process the incoming message added
to an estimate of the possible error. When receiving the
QoS-Sync message, the SS synchronizes its clock and then
sends 12 consecutive QoS-RSPs to the 3TCAE entity of
the managing RS-3TCAC . We propose to use only 9
received packets in total in order to estimate the mean
jitter value on the edge link; the 3 remaining packets are
sent in order to tolerate possible packets loss. After get-
ting 9 packets, the RS-3TCAC ignores the other packets.
If the jitter estimation fails, it will be resumed after a
configured threshold period in order to tolerate the behav-
ior of malicious entities which try to conduct a DoS by
over-exploiting the RS’s resources.
The delay estimation on the wireless edge links and on
the backbone is very similar to the jitter estimation one.
More precisely, the delay will be estimated using the same
control packets required to compute the jitter. Note that
the mobile RS should re-estimate the delay on the edge
links in case of handover. Besides, the requested delays for
the served flows will be updated in order to compensate
the handover delays.
4.2.4 Handover disturbance compensation
The handover process induces delaysmainly caused by the
signalling exchange and the switching of the connection
to a new access station. Therefore, the additional delays
should be compensated in order to provide the level of
QoS that was agreed. Besides, we assume that the hand-
ing over RS does not start the compensation procedure
before performing handover and allowing each managed
SS to perform the QoS re-estimation. We propose that
when the handing over mobile RS begins the handover
process, it triggers the trusted duration measurement ser-
vice. When the mobile RS attaches to a new access node
and the managed SSs terminate the QoS re-estimation
procedure, the trusted duration measurement should be
stopped in order to compute a trusted value of the dura-
tion of the handover process. The obtained delay is then
subtracted from the delay values of the current flows if its
value is smaller than the previously agreed value. How-
ever, if this is not the case or if wemay not find an available
route that offers the updated value, we may try to sub-
tract a portion of the handover delay using either a linear
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approach or an exponential approach. Note that regarding
the first attempt of QoS compensation, the MR-BS man-
aging the handing over RS may select a route based on the
stored values of QoS offered by the routes to the destina-
tion. Nevertheless, that first attempt of QoS compensation
may fail because the MR-BS may take its decision before
the periodic update of the offered QoS.
Regarding the linear approach, we assume that a mobile
q xmilliseconds to execute the handover process. We also
assume that we updated the delay value by subtracting the
delay needed for handover and that we performed a first
CAC on a selected route and that CAC was fruitless. The
3TCAC component of the handing over RS triggers the
trusted duration measurement service in order to com-
pute the delay of the first admission control process. Let
that delay be equal to del. We propose to launch 8 paral-
lel admission control procedures, first we update the delay
value by subtracting x + del − 8y, and then we subtract
x + del − 7y and so on until we find a suitable route that
supports an updated delay value. the choice of the value
of ymay be random or it may be proportional to the value
of x; it will vary according to the environment conditions
and the load. Wemay then sense the satisfaction degree of
the user when the compensation is processed and the sat-
isfaction degree of the user when the compensation is not
processed. The handover disturbance compensation using
the linear approach in case where the handover delay is
smaller than the initial flow’s delay andwhere the first pro-
cessed CAC is fruitless is described by the pseudo-code in
Algorithm 1.
The choice of executing 8 parallel admission control
procedures is totally random, other numerical scenarios
may be experimented. We remind that the choice of the
value of y may be random or it may be proportional
to the value of x; it will vary according to the environ-
ment conditions and the load. Nevertheless, the value of
x+del−y needs to be inferior to x. Regarding the exponen-
tial approach, we propose to launch 4 parallel admission
control procedures, first we update the delay value by sub-
tracting x + del − 8y, and then we subtract x + del − 4y,
and then we subtract x + del − 2y and finally we subtract
x + del − y until we find a suitable route that supports an
updated delay value.
As the jitter is the variation in time between packets
arriving, accelerating packets through the network will
reduce the jitter. More precisely, the jitter caused by han-
dover may be compensated through determining when
packets should arrive at the destination and then accel-
erating them accordingly. Moreover, the handover distur-
bance compensation in terms of delay or jitter may also be
achieved through augmenting the value of the minimum
required rate since providing more bandwidth to a flow
results in accelerating that flow. Besides, the handover
compensation in terms of bandwidth may be combined to
the handover compensation in terms of delay in order to
minimize the handover impact on the QoS sensitive flows
and increase the probability of finding a suitable new route
that fulfills the new QoS constraints.
Algorithm 1 Handover compensation using the linear
approach.
If (RS begins handover)
Start Trusted Duration Measurement Service
If (RS ends handover)
End Trusted Duration Measurement Service
Compute the handover delay = x (ms)
Initial flow delay = ifd
If (x > ifd)
{ifd = ifd −x
Initiate CAC on chosen link
Start Trusted Duration Measurement Service
If (CAC on chosen link ended)
End Trusted Duration Measurement Service
Compute the CAC delay = del (ms)
If (CAC is fruitless)
// Process linear compensation
Initiate y
For (i = 0; i < 8; i + +)
{Choose a different link
Launch CAC on chosen link with updated delay
value = x + del − (i∗y)
Wait for the corresponding result
}
If (one suitable route is found)
Send flow on the suitable route
}// end If (x > ifd)
4.3 Intrusion tolerance within the multihop relay
networks
The intrusion tolerance concept is implemented through
performing the intrusion detection and then implement-
ingmechanisms in order to survive the detected intrusion.
In an IEEE 802.16j context, the RSs are normally con-
trolled by the operator; thus, the probability of attacking
them is much smaller than the probability of attacks
within a traditional mesh network. Even if some attacks,
such as selfish behavior, are not very common because the
RSs do not have their own flows to transmit, an attacker
may take control of one or more RSs or place a rogue RS,
[18]. In order to fulfill the intrusion tolerance property, we
enable the sub/superordinate RS or the MR-BS to detect
the malicious party and then act.
4.3.1 Intrusion tolerance context
The relay RSs within multihop relay networks are con-
trolled by the operator. Therefore, the probability of taking
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control over RSs is relatively low. We propose to only
use the insecure wireless channel to forward the sig-
nalling messages within multihop relay networks but we
use the 3TCAC services to detect some attacks. Using
only the insecure wireless channel enhances the scalability
property of our protocol and reduces the overhead.
In order to protect the integrity of the signalling mes-
sages and verify the identity of the sender, each 3TCAE(n)
forwards the received message to its 3TCAC(n) which
uses encryption keys for un-signing and verifying it.
Besides, all the signalling messages are produced by the
3TCAC and signed by it then relayed to the entity. There-
fore, we are sure about the validity of the control informa-
tion composing the message.
4.3.2 Tolerating time-based attacks
Let us assume that the entity of the RS (subordinate
3TCAE(n − 1) or current 3TCAE(n)) does not send
the control message at time. Two principal causes may
be responsible of this incident. The first cause is that
the processing capacities of the RS(n) or of RS(n − 1)
are saturated. The second cause is that either RS(n),
or RS(n − 1), or both have been controlled by a mali-
cious party and that it has become a malicious RS.
If the RS becomes malicious, the delay and/or jitter
will seem much longer on the route; thus probably
causing DoS to managed SSs. The managed SSs will
probably hand over because they can not be correctly
served. If multiple malicious RSs are injected within a
certain region/area of the network, a distributed DoS
occurs.
In order to tolerate the previously described attack,
we define two threshold values: the MaxDelayThreshold
and the MaxJitterThresold. When the RS-3TCAC(n)
computes the jitter or the delay on the link between
itself and its subordinate, it compares the obtained
values to the threshold ones. If the obtained values
are larger than the thresholds, we propose that RS-
3TCAC(n) renews its entity and then increments the
probably-malicious-RS variable for it and its subordi-
nate. When the probably-malicious-RS variable reaches
a pre-configured threshold, the concerned 3TCAC
sends a probably-malicious-RS-Alert signaling message
which will be forwarded till the MR-BS. The values
of MaxDelayThreshold and MaxJitterThresold may be
dynamically updated according to numerous factors such
as the history of the feasible QoS on the links, the load
conditions, etc.
When 3TCAE(n− 1) asks its 3TCAC(n− 1) for provid-
ing the QoS-Estimmessage that will be used for jitter esti-
mation, 3TCAC(n− 1) will verify that it is really receiving
the demand for that signalling message every 20ms using
its trusted absolute timestamping service. However, note
that 3TCAC(n− 1) can not verify whether 3TCAE(n− 1)
has really sent the QoS-Estim message as soon as it (i.e.,
that entity) received the demanded message.
The trivial idea to prevent the malicious RSs from suc-
ceeding in their attacks is that the MR-BS isolates them.
However, isolating the malicious RSs will decrease the
coverage area. More precisely, the more the isolated mali-
cious RS is close to the root MR-BS within the network
tree, the more the probability of deleting multiple routes
increases and the more the coverage area of the network
is minimized. Besides, even if the isolated malicious RS is
a leaf in the network tree, all the SSs served by it need to
change their access entity and a whole area will become
uncovered. Nevertheless, only the route comprising that
malicious leaf RS will be deleted and multiple other routes
will not be affected by the isolation.
We think that isolating the malicious RSs will have
severe consequences on the performance of the MR net-
work. If the previously described time-based attack occurs
when evaluating the QoS for the first time, the MR-BS
may temporarily adopt the estimated values (i.e., which
are worse than the values that would be estimated if the RS
was not malicious) and then trigger a maintenance proce-
dure that will be handled by the operator’s control center.
However, if the detection of a malicious RS occurs during
the data transmission phase, the MR-BS which receives
the probably-malicious-RS-Alert signaling message has
already stored the QoS that can be provided on each link
of the concerned route. In order to tolerate the attack, the
MR-BS calculates the delay and/or jitter induced by the
presence of the malicious RS by comparing the new QoS
values enclosed in the probably-malicious-RS-Alert sig-
naling message to the old QoS values which were used to
admit the flows. Then, the MR-BS chooses the links (i.e.,
RSs) that will be involved in the compensation procedure
according to the load and sends them a DSC-REQ sig-
naling message while indicating the new values of delay,
jitter and throughput. The MR-BS also triggers the main-
tenance procedure in order to rapidly fix the cause of the
malicious behavior of the attacking RS.
4.3.3 Tolerating attacks caused by the SSs and attacks on
the backbone
SSs are mobile entities which can either directly attach to
the MR-BSs or access the MR network via RSs. Colluding
SSs acting within the same coverage area may try to cause
a DoS to their access point by sending multiple requests
at the same time in order to saturate the processing capa-
bilities of the managing RS or MR-BS. In order to tolerate
such attack, the 3TCAC kernels will be configured to not
process more than a threshold value of requests sent by
the same SS within a period of time and to not process
more than n requests or QoS estimations overall.
In order to tolerate replay attacks on the backbone,
we indicate that each 3TCAC which composes a new
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signalling message should append to it the current times-
tamp value. As all 3TCAC modules are synchronized, the
replay attacks attempted by malicious entities will be eas-
ily detected when the receiving 3TCAC verifies whether
its current timestamp value is much superior to the value
indicated within the received signalling message added to
the delay on that link.
4.3.4 Tolerating RSs refusing to forward signalling
messages on the backbone
Malicious RSs may refuse to participate in the periodic
QoS estimation procedure or may refuse to forward the
signalling messages such as QoS-Estim, BS-QoS-INFO,
etc in order to prevent an efficient management of the
QoS. If they collude with other malicious RSs, they
may refuse to forward the probably-malicious-RS-Alert in
order to prevent theMR-BS from adapting theQoS distur-
bance compensation and triggering the maintenance pro-
cedure. In order to tolerate the attacks targeting QoS esti-
mation, each 3TCAC(n) module should verify whether it
is receiving the signalling message from 3TCAC(n − 1)
within a tolerance period. If it is not the case, 3TCAC(n)
will increment its own probably-malicious-RS variable
and the probably-malicious-RS variable of its subordi-
nate and send the probably-malicious-RS-Alertdescribing
the RS for which theprobably-malicious-RS variable has
reached the configured threshold.
The tolerance period is computed as the period of
estimating QoS added to the previously-computed delay
on the link added to a maximum threshold value.
Colluding malicious RSs which refuse to forward the
probably-malicious-RS-Alert are not easily tolerated as
each RS can only have one superordinate. In more detail,
if the RS(n)’s superordinate and subordinate are both
colluding malicious RSs, theprobably-malicious-RS-Alert
sent by RS(n) in order to inform about the malicious
behavior of the subordinate will never reach the MR-BS
and RS(n) will not be able to detect that fact.
4.3.5 Tolerating RSs refusing to forward data flows
We already specified that theMR-BS stores the QoS infor-
mation related to the routes but that it may perform
admission control for certain flows. Note that certain
malicious RSs may indicate negative responses to the
received DSA-REQ. To tolerate such an attack, the man-
aging MR-BS should keep the history of the negative
responses. As the QoS estimation is periodically pro-
cessed, a malicious RS that tries to pretend higher delay
and jitter values will be easily detected by its 3TCAC as
it has been described earlier (i.e., detecting time-based
attacks). In this case, the fact that the RS negatively
responds to the DSA-REQsmay confirm that it has amali-
cious behavior. However, if the RS is malicious but it has
correctly performed the QoS estimation within the next
period, the value contained in the probably-malicious-RS
table will be incremented. Besides, if that value reaches a
threshold, the MR-BS will order the SSs which are man-
aged by the concerned RS to hand over and then trigger
the maintenance phase.
A malicious RS may try to cause DoS for some of
its managed SSs by refusing to relay their flows and by
stopping relaying the MR-BS messages to them while
updating the list of its managed SSs. The 3TCAC of
the malicious RS will no longer receive data from the
attacked SSs. The MR-BS deduces that the attacked SSs
have been shutted down because if they were alive and
they quited the coverage area, they should have initi-
ated a handover process. This attack is more severe if the
malicious RS is a mobile one because the IEEE 802.16j
specifications indicate that the managed SSs of a mobile
RS need to handover with it (i.e., follow it) so that the
attacked SSs can not independently perform handover
or network re-entry. This attack is not easy to counter
because the managed SSs may suddenly shut down in
case of power shortage for example. When the 3TCAC of
an RS can no longer receive messages from a threshold
number of SSs, the probably-malicious-RS variable should
be incremented. When that variable reaches a threshold
value, the probably-malicious-RS-Alert will be sent to the
3TCAC kernel of the managing MR-BS over the secure
wireless channel in order to trigger the maintenance
procedure.
5 Properties and features of 3TCA-based relay
networks
The 3TCAC architecture for multihop relay networks
compensates the QoS level of handing over SSs through
accelerating the affected flows on some links of the estab-
lished path. More precisely, the delay of the handover
operation is first measured by the handing over RS. After
that, a compensation of that delay is processed through
increasing the bandwidth values and decreasing the delay
and jitter values relative to the affected flows on cho-
sen links along the route. To that end, a first CAC
is processed in order to determine the links that may
accelerate the affected flows. If that CAC is not success-
ful, a second compensation is attempted while adopting
a linear or an exponential approach in order to com-
pensate a portion of the handover and the first CAC
induced delays.
In order to authenticate the SSs and protect the sig-
nalling messages exchanged between the SS and its access
entity, each SS shares a private key with the managing
RS or MR-BS. Colluding malicious SSs which send simul-
taneous requests to the managing RS will not succeed
in causing a distributed DoS as the 3TCACs process the
incomingmessages and are configured to not handlemore
than n requests overall.
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Malicious RSs may try to replay the control messages
in order to cause a DoS to their superordinate or to tam-
per with the results of the QoS estimation. The 3TCACs
will resist to the DoS because they are configured to not
process more than n signalling messages overall. Besides,
each signalling message encompasses a timestamp value
added by the issuing 3TCAC andmarking the instant of its
generation. As all the 3TCACs are synchronized, replayed
messages are easily detected by the receiving 3TCAC
which has to verify its current timestamp value in order to
decide whether the message is replayed. All replayed mes-
sages will be simply ignored. Malicious RSs may also try to
usurp the identity of other RSs or modify the integrity of
the signalling message in order to tamper with the results
of QoS estimation. This attack is detected since all sig-
nalling messages are created by the 3TCACs which also
sign them. Note that the 3TCACs store the public keys
of their subordinates and their superordinate in order to
verify the signatures of the exchanged messages.
The DoS attacks may be caused by malicious RSs
which refuse to forward the signalling messages carry-
ing the QoS information or participating in evaluating
this information. In order to tolerate the attacks tar-
geting the QoS estimation, each 3TCAC is configured
to raise an exception if the periodic signalling mes-
sage is not received within a pre-configured thresh-
old time period. In this case, the 3TCAC incre-
ments its own probably-malicious-RS variable and the
probably-malicious-RS variable of the considered subor-
dinate and an alert will bep sent to the managing MR-BS
if the probably-malicious-RS variable reaches a threshold
value.
Malicious RSs may try to pretend higher delay and jit-
ter values through not forwarding the signalling messages
on time. The receiving 3TCAC is strengthened with pre-
configured threshold variables stating the maximum delay
and the maximum jitter that characterize the considered
link. When the evaluated delay (or jitter) exceeds the
pre-configured threshold, the 3TCAC increments its own
probably − malicious − RS variable and the probably −
malicious − RSvariable of the considered subordinate.
When that variable reaches a pre-configured threshold,
an alert is sent to the managing MR-BS. The MR-BS tol-
erates the malicious behavior through compensating the
excess in delay (or jitter) by accelerating the transmission
of the affected flows on other chosen branches on the
route between it and the probably malicious RS. If needed,
the MR-BS may coordinate with the other intermediate
access entities (i.e., RSs and MR-BSs) on the route to the
destination in order to compensate the malicious distur-
bance. The MR-BS also sends an alert to the operator’s
control center in order to request a maintenance proce-
dure. Besides, RSs which negatively respond to a request
of flows forwarding or to a compensation procedure are
marked. When the history of negative responses of a cer-
tain RS reaches a pre-configured value, that RS will be
considered as suspicious and an alert is sent to theMR-BS.
It is valuable to note that our 3TCAC architecture
does not isolate the probably malicious RSs, especially
when they are advertising higher QoS values. Contrar-
ily, we propose to continue using them for forwarding
traffic while compensating the disturbance caused by the
malicious behavior using other legitimate RSs. The QoS
compensation is done identically to the compensation in
the group mobility case described earlier (i.e., the RS’s
handover). Besides, the MR-BS requests the maintenance
procedure from the operator’s control center. If the mali-
cious RSs refuses to participate in the QoS estimation
procedures, the QoS values that were validated in the
previous period will be adopted until the maintenance is
performed.
The proposed 3TCA architecture achieves a good level
of intrusion tolerance since it rapidly detects and tolerates
a large range of DoS and timely-based attacks. In particu-
lar, 3TCAmay detect and tolerate Distributed DoS attacks
(i.e., DDoS) that are mainly caused by colluding malicious
SSs or colluding malicious RSs. Thanks to the configured
threshold values and the synchronous behavior, a 3TCAC
component is able to detect any DoS attack bombarding
it or any DoS issued by malicious RSs refusing to cor-
rectly participate in the QoS estimation or in the data
transfer. Moreover, the synchronous behavior of a 3TCA
component enables it to easily detect replay attacks and
time-based attacks aiming at tampering with the offered
QoS. Attacks relative to the integrity of the transmit-
ted messages and the authenticity of the participating
entities in the route establishment and data transfer are
easily detected and countered thanks to the authentication
service guaranteed by the 3TCACs.
Besides, the 3TCA architecture induces a reduced num-
ber of false positives since the 3TCACs do not imme-
diately declare an RS as malicious. They rather use two
stages of variables and thresholds. If the first threshold
is reached, the variable describing the malicious behav-
ior of the RS is incremented until a second threshold
is reached. More precisely, an RS is not declared mali-
cious before the second threshold is reached. Therefore,
we indirectly take into consideration the non-malicious
causes of disturbance such as the saturation of a proces-
sor or the lateness or loss of data and signalling packets
due to unfavorable transmission conditions. Meanwhile,
the 3TCA architecture induces a reduced number of
false negatives since it relies on the trusted 3TCACs. As
described earlier, 3TCACs provide trusted security and
time-related services which enable a rigorous control of
the behavior of themalicious entities that are participating
in the QoS estimation, the routes establishment and the
data transfer.
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The 3TCACs implement a trusted authentication ser-
vice that secures the communication between a 3TCAE
and its managing 3TCAC. In more detail, the trusted
authentication service enables the 3TCAE to share a
secret key with its 3TCAC. That key is then used to
establish a secure channel between the 3TCAE and the
correspondent 3TCAC over which the exchanged data
may be encrypted. The trusted authentication service also
enables each 3TCAE to authenticate its managing 3TCAC
and ensures that the compromise of old keys does not
enable a passive attacker to compromise future keys and
does not allow an active adversary to fulfill impersonation.
The trusted authentication service provided by 3TCACs
builds on the Local Authentication service offered by the
TTCB simply because we wish to provide the same pro-
tection level assessed and verified in [19]. Besides, the
3TCACs of our proposed architecture use asymmetric
cryptography in order to verify the integrity of the mes-
sages they exchange between them and authenticate the
issuers.
The 3TCACs use the trusted duration measurement
service, the trusted absolute timestamping service, the
trusted authentication service and the trusted random
number generation service of the TTCB components in
order to evaluate the handover delays in a trusted manner
and to secure the communication between the 3TCAEs
and the 3TCACs. Nevertheless, the 3TCACs implement
the trusted intrusion-related service which is in charge
of inspecting particular variables that are used to detect
intrusions if their values exceed pre-defined thresholds.
Therefore, 3TCACs may detect specific implementations
of DoS, DDoS, and replay attacks and may identify the
suspicious RSs and tolerate their malicious behaviors.
Moreover, the 3TCACs are used to evaluate the han-
dover duration and then compensate the induced delays
in a trusted manner through processing CAC on chosen
links. In a similar way, the negative impact of detected
intrusions on the agreed QoS is evaluated and then
compensated.
6 Performance evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the 3TCA
architecture and determine whether the obtained results
may be generalized.
6.1 Mathematical representations
Let SSj andDj be two communicating SSs belonging to the
MRS network. Let SSj bemanaged by amobile RSm andDj
managed by RSDj . Let MR-BS(RSm) be theMR-BSmanag-
ing RSm and MR-BS(RSDj) be the MR-BS managing RSDj .
We define HOd as the delay required by RSm to perform
the handoff process. This delay includes the delay required
by the managed SSs to re-estimate the QoS available on
the edge links between them and the mobile RSm in its
new position. Let Adi,j be the agreed delay for flow i of
the managed SSj. Therefore, Adi,j = Min [Ad1i,j, Ad2i,j],
where Ad1i,j is the agreed delay for flow i of the man-
aged SS j before handoff and Ad2i,j is the agreed delay for
the flow i of the managed SS j after the handoff and the
QoS re-estimation. Let R be the set of the available routes
between MR-BS(RSm) and RSDj . The following cases are
considered.
• If HOd < Adi,j, MR-BS(RSm) needs to find r ∈ R that
fulfills the updated delay value Adi,j = Adi,j − HOd
based on the QoS information exchanged with the
other MR-BSs and collected on the backbone. After
that, the MR-BS(RSm) will perform a CAC on the
chosen route. Let deli,j be the delay required by
MR-BS(RSm) to perform the CAC on the selected
route r. This procedure is the first delay
compensation attempt.
• If HOd < Adi,j and r fulfillingAdi,j = Adi,j − HOd ,
we perform a second delay compensation attempt
while adopting either a linear approach or an
exponential approach.
– If the linear approach is adopted, choose
y ∈ ℵ and n ∈ ℵ and then launch n parallel
CAC procedures on n routes in order to
satisfy the condition
(Adi,j − (HOd + deli,j − ky)) > 0; k ∈[ 1, n].
Then select the route that satisfies
Min[Adi,j − (HOd + deli,j − ky)] as the route
on which the flow will be transmitted.
– If the exponential approach is adopted,
choose y ∈ ℵ and n ∈ ℵ, where n = 2k and
then launch k + 1 parallel CAC procedures on
k + 1 routes in order to satisfy the condition
(Adi,j − (HOd + deli,j − 2hy)) > 0; h ∈[ 0, k].
Then select the route that satisfies
Min[Adi,j − (HOd + deli,j − 2hy)] as the
route on which the flow will be transmitted.
• If HOd > Adi,j, we perform a delay compensation
attempt while adopting either a linear approach or an
exponential approach.
– If the linear approach is adopted, choose y ∈ ℵ
and n ∈ ℵ and then launch n parallel CAC
procedures on n routes in order to satisfy the
condition (Adi,j− (HOd −ky)) > 0; k ∈[ 1, n].
Then select the route that satisfies
Min[Adi,j − (HOd − ky)] as the route on
which the flow will be transmitted.
– If the exponential approach is adopted,
choose y ∈ ℵ and n ∈ ℵ where n = 2k and
then launch k + 1 parallel CAC procedures on
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k + 1 routes in order to satisfy the condition
(Adi,j − (HOd − 2hy)) > 0; h ∈[ 0, k]. Then
select the route that satisfies
Min[Adi,j − (HOd − 2hy)] as the route on
which the flow will be transmitted.
Note that the HOd may be replaced by Intrusiond which
is the delay induced by an intrusion in case of QoS com-
pensation under intrusions.
Now, let nbrss be the number of SSs managed by the
mobile RS RSm. The HOd value (i.e., that encompasses the
delays of handoff and QoS re-estimation) according to the
number of managed SSs can be given by the formula:
HOd = α + exp(nbrSS), (1)
where α is the mean delay of a hard IEEE 802.16j handoff.
Let nbrHopsBS be the number of intermediate hops
from the RSm til MR-BS(RSm). Let nbrHopsBSDestr be the
number of hops from MR-BS(RSm) til RSDj on the route r
where r ∈ R. We define the delay of transmitting the DSA-
REQ or DSC-REQmessage from the RSm to MR-BS(RSm)
as dREQ-BS. Meanwhile, we define the delay of transmit-
ting the corresponding DSA-RSP or DSC-RSP from the
MR-BS(RSm) til the RSm as dRSP-BS. Besides, we define the
delay of transmitting the DSA-REQ or DSC-REQmessage
on the intermediate nodes from MR-BS(RSm) to the des-
tination RSDj on a particular route r as (dREQ -inter)r and
we define (dRSP-inter)r as the delay of transmitting the cor-
responding DSA-RSP or DSC-RSP message from RSDj to
MR-BS(RSm) on the intermediate nodes of a particular
route r; r ∈ R. These delays on a particular route r are













where (dtransREQ)l is the delay required for transmitting
a DSA-REQ or DSC-REQ message on the wireless link l
and (dtransRSP)l is the delay required for transmitting a
DSA-RSP or a DSC-RSP message on the wireless link l.
As MR-BS(RSm) knows the periodically updated values
of the QoS offered by the routes belonging to R, it may
select the most appropriate route rselected ∈ R that offers
the required QoS after handover. We define the delay
deli,j required to process a first delay compensation as the
delay of transmitting the DSA-REQs or DSC-REQs on the
selected route rselected then receiving the corresponding
DSA-RSP or DSC-RSPs on the same route:
deli,j = dREQ-BS + (dREQ-inter)rselected + (dRSP-inter)rselected
+ dRSP-BS
(5)
If HOd < Adi,j but the first delay compensation attempt
is fruitless (i.e., for example due to an update of the QoS
values offered by the routes), a second delay compensation
will be performed. Let (del2lini,j)n be the delay required
to perform the second delay compensation on n selected
routes with updated QoS values while adopting the lin-
ear approach. Moreover, let R = {rselected}  (R2sel)n 
(R2sel)n where (R2sel)n is the set of the most appropriate n
routes on which a new CAC procedure will be processed
and (R2sel)n is the set of the remaining routes. (del2lini,j)n
is given by the following formula:









note that, after processing the CAC on the n selected
routes, the MR-BS(RSm) will send a unique DSA-RSP or a
DSC-RSP indicating the route offering theminimumdelay
on which the flow will be transmitted.
Let (del2expi,j)k be the delay required to perform the
second delay compensation while adopting the exponen-
tial approach. Let us remember that n = 2k . In this case, a
new CAC procedure is processed on the most appropriate
k + 1 routes. Meanwhile, let R = {rselected}  (R2sel)k 
(R2sel)k where (R2sel)k is the set of the most appropri-
ate k + 1 routes on which the CAC procedure will be
processed and (R2sel)k is the set of the remaining routes.
(del2expi,j)k is given by the following formula:




[ (dREQ-inter)r + (dRSP-inter)r] ,
(7)
note that, after processing the CAC on the k + 1 selected
routes, the MR-BS(RSm) will send a unique DSA-RSP or a
DSC-RSP indicating the route offering theminimumdelay
on which the flow will be transmitted.
If HOd > Adi,j and we adopt the linear approach to
compensate the handover delay, (dellini,j)n will be the
delay of such a compensation. In this case, the CAC proce-
dure is straightforward processed on themost appropriate
n routes that may fulfill the QoS requirements. Let R =
(R1sel)n  (R1sel)n where (R1sel)n is the set of the most
appropriate n routes on which the CAC procedure will be
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processed and (R1sel)n is the set of the remaining routes.
(dellini,j)n is given by the following formula:




[ (dREQ-inter)r + (dRSP-inter)r] ,
(8)
note that, after processing the CAC on the n selected
routes, the MR-BS(RSm) will send a unique DSA-RSP or a
DSC-RSP indicating the route offering theminimumdelay
on which the flow will be transmitted.
Lastly, if HOd > Adi,j and we straightway adopt the
exponential approach to compensate the handover delay,
a CAC procedure will be processed on the most appropri-
ate k + 1 routes. Let us remember that n = 2k . Let R =
(R1sel)k  (R1sel)k where (R1sel)k is the set of the most
appropriate k + 1 routes on which the CAC procedure
will be processed and (R1sel)k is the set of the remaining
routes. (delexpi,j)k will be the delay of such compensation,
it is given by the following formula:




[ (dREQ-inter)r + (dRSP-inter)r] ,
(9)
note that, after processing the CAC on the k + 1 selected
routes, the MR-BS(RSm) will send a unique DSA-RSP or a
DSC-RSP indicating the route offering theminimumdelay
on which the flow will be transmitted.
Note that when (R2sel)n = (R1sel)n, (del2lini,j)n will
be obviously superior than (dellini,j)n by deli,j. Similarly,
when (R2sel)k = (R1sel)k , (del2expi,j)k will be obviously
superior than (delexpi,j)k by deli,j.
6.2 Simulation model
In order to estimate the performance of the 3TCA archi-
tecture for QoS routing and intrusion tolerance provision
within the multihop relay network, we adopt the network
shown in Figure 5. The network encompasses mobile N-
LoS RSs such as the RS12, fixed LoS RSs such as RS11 and
RS13 and a set of MR-BSs interconnected with a wireless
backbone. The mobile RS12 hands over and enters into
the coverage area of RS11. RS12 manages two SSs which
are SS11 and SS12. Each SS has a unique flow to be trans-
mitted. The fixed and mobile RSs along with the MR-BSs
host trusted 3TCACs.
We propose to perform four simulations. To that aim,
we wrote the code implementing the 3TCA features and
then we fixed simulation scenarios and we computed
the execution cost of the scenarios implementation. The
first considered scenario consists of a mobile RS that
moves with its two managed SSs. The other scenarios
consider legitimate andmalicious RSs performing QoS re-
estimation. First, we only detect the attack, and then we
detect the attack and we tolerate it through processing
QoS compensation. This will be further detailed when we
describe each simulation context.
The goal of the first simulation is to evaluate the con-
nection establishment delay when QoS compensation is
processed after handover. The second simulation intends
to determine the overhead induced by the QoS compen-
sation process after handover. In both simulations, we
consider the scenario when RS12 hands over to enter into
the coverage area of RS11. In the third simulation, we pro-
pose to estimate the processing delay when our network
is under attack and we evaluate the cost of guaranteeing
intrusion-tolerance and of performing QoS compensation
after being the victim of an intrusion. Finally, the last
simulation aims at determining the overhead caused by
the QoS compensation in case of intrusion. Note that for
the described simulations, we assume that the delay is
proportional to the number of executed operations.
Figure 5 The chosen network for simulations.
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Figure 6 Number of operations executed when handover compensation is provided.
6.3 Evaluating the performance of the 3TCA’s protocols
The first curve shown in Figure 6 estimates the num-
ber of operations executed when the RS12 moves with
its managed SSs. The first attempt reflects the situa-
tion when the handover delay is smaller than the already
agreed delay and when the handover compensation is suc-
cessful from the first time. Therefore, the delay required
to process the first attempt includes the delay described
by Equation (6) along with the delay required to pro-
cess the QoS re-estimation between the managed SSs and
the handing over RS after handover. The second attempt
reflects the situation when the handover delay is superior
to the already agreed delay so that a linear approach is
adopted. Therefore, the second attempt includes the delay
described by the Equation (9) and the delay of QoS re-
estimation. The third attempt reflects the situation when
the handover delay is smaller than the already agreed
delay and when the handover compensation is not suc-
cessful from the first time so that a linear approach is
adopted. Therefore, the third attempt includes the delay
described by the Equation (7) along with the delay of QoS
re-estimation. The simulated case assumes that for the
two times where the linear approach has been adopted,
(R2sel)n = (R1sel)n. Note that three points of the abscissa
axis reflect the three main scenarios of the handover’s
impact compensation.
The experimental results confirm the theoretical
results. More precisely, when the handover delay is
smaller than the already agreed delay and the first com-
pensation attempt is successful from the first time (i.e., the
first point in the abscissa axis), only a CAC on a chosen
route is performed and that route is able to provide the
updated values of QoS. The delay of performing that suc-
cessful first CAC is deli,j. Moreover, when the handover
delay is larger than the already agreed delay (i.e., the sec-
ond point in the abscissa axis), only a first compensation
attempt is performed. In this case, the CAC is processed
on n routes and the resulting delay is (dellini,j)n. Note that
(dellini,j)n is superior than deli,j because we perform the
CAC on n routes and not only on one chosen route. How-
ever, when the handover delay is smaller than the already
agreed delay and the first compensation attempt is fruit-
less, we perform a second compensation attempt (i.e., the
third point in the abscissa axis). As we simulate the case
where (R2sel)n = (R1sel)n, (del2lini,j)n will be superior
than (dellini,j)n because it includes deli,j.
We may conclude that adopting the compensation
induces some delay when it is not successful from the first
Figure 7 Number of messages exchanged when handover compensation is provided.
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time. Note that the delay caused by an unsuccessful com-
pensation for the first time is taken into consideration
when trying the compensation for the second time.
The second curve shown in Figure 7 estimates the num-
ber of the signalling messages exchanged when the RS12
hands over with its managed SSs. The same simulation
scenario of the estimation of the connection establish-
ment delay with handover compensation is adopted. Note
that the number of exchanged messages increases espe-
cially when the compensation is not successful from the
first time, which is an expected behavior.
In order to evaluate the performance of the 3TCA archi-
tecture with respect to intrusion tolerance, we consider
various situations in which some RSs become malicious
during the periodic QoS estimation on the backbone.
More precisely, we increase the number of malicious
nodes and we observe the delay and overhead induced by
detecting and tolerating the intrusions. The first point of
the abscissa axis shown by Figures 8 and 9 reflects the sit-
uation when the QoS re-estimation procedure is normally
processed (i.e., without facing any intrusions). The sec-
ond point of the abscissa axis reflects the situation when
the QoS re-estimation faces an intrusion at the RS23 level
but the threshold value of the probably-malicious-RS vari-
able is not yet reached. In this case, only the value of
that variable is incremented without affecting the nor-
mal QoS re-estimation procedure. The third point of
the abscissa axis reflects the situation when the QoS re-
estimation faces an intrusion at both RS23 and RS31
levels. In this case, the intrusions are detected but the
3TCACs do not react because the probably-malicious-RS
threshold is not yet reached. Lastly, the fourth point of
the abscissa axis reflects the situation when RS23, RS31,
and RS15 are malicious and a compensation procedure
is processed for RS15 while the intrusions of RS23 and
RS31 are only detected. The 3TCACs do not react because
the probably-malicious-RS threshold is not yet reached
for both RS23 and RS31. However, the delay estimated by
RS14 is superior to the threshold and the threshold value
of the probably-malicious-RS variable is reached. In that
case, RS14 sends the probably-malicious-RS-Alert to the
MR-BS1 which reacts by attempting an intrusion compen-
sation on the link RS13 → MR-BS1. Note that the four
points of the abscissa axis are particularly chosen to reflect
the main intrusion tolerance behavior in case of attacks.
As shown by Figure 8, the processing delay increases
in case of intrusion. Moreover, the more the number of
malicious RSs increases, the more the intrusion tolerance
processing delay augments. The delay of the compensa-
tion attempt is important as the MR-BS needs to ask the
involved RSs of the compensation links in order to decide
whether the compensation is possible.
Let us now further evaluate the performance of our
proposed architecture regarding intrusion-tolerance. To
achieve this, we propose to compare the simulation results
obtained within theMMR networks context to those of an
intrusion tolerant routing protocol within the mesh con-
text. Such a routing protocol, called MERQIT, has been
presented in [9]. We think that such a comparison is
appropriate for two reasons. On one hand, both protocols
address the combination of the intrusion tolerance prop-
erty and the QoS provision within the context of mobile
wireless networks. On the other hand, the MERQIT pro-
tocol relies on clusterheads in providing connection to
Non Line of Sight mobile subscribers. Indeed, the clus-
terheads considered by MERQIT may be compared to the
relays considered by the MMR networks; the main differ-
ence between them is that the relays are managed by the
network operator while the clusterheads are not.
We note that the simulation results obtained for the
3TCA architecture in case of intrusion confirm the results
describing the MERQIT protocol behavior in case of
intrusions. Particularly, Figure 8 shows the processing
delay according to the number of malicious nodes within
a mesh network. We notice that the processing delay does
not highly increase when a malicious clusterhead is only
detected without being isolated, but that the same delay
becomes very important when the number of malicious
Figure 8 Processing delay according to malicious nodes number.
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Figure 9 Number of exchangedmessages with respect to malicious nodes number.
access nodes increases (i.e., for example when a router
presents malicious entities and should broadcast its sta-
tus to its neighbors or when a clusterhead should be
completely isolated) [9].
Nevertheless, we notice that MERQIT achieves better
delays in the case of intrusions. First, because the simu-
lated case ofMERQIT is limited to QoS provision in terms
of delays and does not consider QoS provision in terms of
jitter, and second, because the MERQIT protocol isolates
the malicious clusterheads or routers and asks the neigh-
boring access nodes to take over if the QoS can be met.
For example, since the same MN is managed by two clus-
terheads and if themanaging router discovers that the first
clusterhead is malicious, it will ask the second clusterhead
to take over. In this case, minor treatments are processed
as the second clusterhead has already all the informa-
tion required to fulfill the failover. The 3TCA architec-
ture rather processes QoS compensation by negotiating
updated QoS values with candidate RSs of chosen links
in order to accelerate the flows affected by the intrusion.
Figure 8 also shows that adopting the isolation principle
of the MERQIT protocol within the MMR networks is not
appropriate. More precisely, when the probably malicious
RS15 and RS14 are isolated, the whole branch of the tree
rooted at RS14 becomes isolated. Consequently, the man-
aged SS13 and SS14 are isolated and need to be rescued. In
order to minimize the isolation impact, MR-BS1 needs to
ask the neighboringMR-BS2 whether it is managing an RS
that is in LoS with the isolated SSs and whether that can-
didate rescuing RS belongs to a path that fulfills the SSs’
QoS requirements. If it is the case, the isolated SSs will
handover in order to attach to the rescuing RS and then
they will process an edge QoS estimation with their new
managing access node. This costly procedure in terms of
processing delay may fail especially when the number of
isolated SSs is important. For these reasons, we argue that
adopting compensation in case of intrusion is more suited
to the MMR context.
Now let us estimate the overhead when tolerating intru-
sions for our proposed scheme relative to MMR networks
and let us adopt the same simulation scenario considering
the processing delay with intrusion tolerance. As shown
in Figure 9, the number of exchanged messages is the
same when the normal QoS re-estimation is processed
and when the intrusion affecting one RS is detected but
not tolerated. That number increases when the number
of malicious RSs increases and when the MR-BS1 tries to
compensate the intrusion.
The overhead estimation results obtained in the MMR
context confirm those obtained for MERQIT. In fact, we
notice that the number of exchanged messages does not
highly vary when a clusterhead is detected as malicious
without being isolated. However, the overhead increases
when the number of malicious access nodes increases. For
example, the overhead augments when a router on the
backbone should broadcast its status or when a manager
should be isolated, [9]. Note that the number of exchanged
messages in the context of MMR networks is superior
to that number in the context of mesh networks mainly
because we have implemented the jitter estimation within
MMR networks. In fact, as stated in Section 2.3, the jit-
ter estimation over a wireless link requires the exchange
of at least 9 packets; thus, increasing the overhead of both
QoS estimation and QoS compensation. Note that adopt-
ing isolation instead of compensation in case of intrusion
within MMR networks induces an important overhead
that increases exponentially with the number of managed
SSs. This overhead results from the CAC processed by
each neighboring MR-BS and its managed RSs along with
the overhead caused by processing the handover opera-
tion and implementing the edge QoS re-estimation with
the rescued SSs.
The simulations adopted in this article estimate the
complexity of the 3TCA architecture in terms of pro-
cessing delay and induced overhead. We may conclude
that the obtained results are expected since one observes
Krichene and Boudriga EURASIP Journal onWireless Communications and Networking 2013, 2013:100 Page 22 of 22
http://jwcn.eurasipjournals.com/content/2013/1/100
an increase of complexity and overhead when compen-
sation is processed. This increase is the normal cost of
an advanced management of QoS that adopts several
attempts of compensation in case of handover and attacks
in order to preserve the initial level of QoS or come
close to that level. The simulation results obtained when
adopting the pre-described simulation model may be gen-
eralized since we simulated the main scenarios of han-
dover’s impact compensation and of intrusion tolerance
behaviors.
7 Conclusion
In this article, we proposed a novel 3TCA architecture
for MMR networks. Our architecture is based on trusted
3TCACs and it addresses the RSs’ mobility through com-
pensating the handover-induced delays. Besides, intru-
sions are detected and their side effects are compensated
in the multihop relay context in order to continue provid-
ing the agreed QoS level despite intrusions. Simulations
show an increase in the complexity reflecting the cost
for intrusion tolerance guarantee and advanced mobility
management.
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